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CHILDREN ARE CRYING AND DYING WHILE 
THE SUPREME COURT IS HIDING:  WHY 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS SHOULD HAVE BROAD 




Bullying has long been a concern for students, parents, teachers, and 
school administrators.  But technological advances—including the internet, 
cell phones, and social media—have transformed the nature of bullying and 
allow “cyberbullies” to extend their reach far beyond the schoolhouse gate. 
The U.S. Supreme Court established that schools may regulate on-campus 
speech if the speech creates a substantial disruption of, or material 
interference with, school activities.  However, the Court has yet to rule on a 
school’s ability to regulate students’ off-campus bullying speech.  This Note 
examines how various courts have approached the issue, analyzes the 
current circuit split, and ultimately proposes that schools should have the 
authority to discipline students for off-campus bullying speech. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old girl, was very excited when an attractive 
teenage boy named Josh Evans sent her a friend request on Facebook and 
began talking to her.1  For several months, Megan rushed home from school 
 
 1. Steve Pokin, ‘My Space’ Hoax Ends with Suicide of Dardenne Prairie Teen, ST. LOUIS 
TODAY (Nov. 11, 2007), http://www.stltoday.com/suburban-journals/stcharles/news/ 
stevepokin/my-space-hoax-ends-with-suicide-of-dardenne-prairie-teen/article_0304c09a-
ab32-5931-9bb3-210a5d5dbd58.html [https://perma.cc/93TZ-YA8B]. 
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to talk to Josh online.2  Megan had a lifelong struggle with weight and self-
esteem, but now she had a boy who made her feel pretty.3  And then one day, 
Josh told Megan he no longer wanted to be her friend.4  Josh then apparently 
shared some of Megan’s messages with others.5  People began commenting 
on Megan’s profile, saying things like, “Megan Meier is a slut.  Megan Meier 
is fat.”6  Megan sobbed.7  She then went to her room and hanged herself.8  
Megan died the next day, three weeks before her fourteenth birthday.9  Josh 
never existed.10  It was all a cyberbullying hoax.11 
Mallory Grossman was a lively twelve-year-old girl who enjoyed 
gymnastics and cheerleading.12  In the fall of 2016, Mallory became a victim 
of bullying from several classmates, both in person and online.13  After 
months of receiving taunts in text messages, Instagram posts, and Snapchats, 
Mallory took her own life.14 
Jason Lamberth did not know why his beautiful thirteen-year-old daughter, 
Hailee, an honor roll student, killed herself.15  Then he read her farewell note.  
“Please tell my school that I killed myself, so that the next time (name 
withheld) wants to call somebody (expletives), maybe they won’t.”16  
Lamberth asserts “[t]here’s no denying bullying played a part in why Hailee 
killed herself.”17 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The person behind this cyberbullying scheme was Lori Drew, the mother of Megan’s 
former friend. Jonann Brady, Exclusive:  Teen Talks About Her Role in Web Hoax That Led 
to Suicide, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=4560582 
[https://perma.cc/HAV3-WEAQ]. 
 12. Samantha Schmidt, After Months of Bullying, Her Parents Say, a 12-Year-Old New 




 13. Justin Zaremba, The Tragic Suicide of 12-Year-Old Mallory Grossman:  A Timeline, 
NJ.COM (Oct. 5, 2017, 10:43 AM), http://www.nj.com/morris/index.ssf/2017/08/ 
timeline_mallory_grossman_death.html [https://perma.cc/4ZMZ-GY8Z]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Paul Takahashi, In Wake of Student’s Suicide, School District Forms Anti-Bullying 
Task Force, L.V. SUN (Mar. 13, 2014, 6:00 PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2014/ 
mar/13/wake-students-suicide-school-district-forms-anti-b/ [https://perma.cc/Y3NX-
W32M]. 
 16. Trevon Milliard, Father:  White Middle School Student’s Suicide Related to Bullying, 
L.V. REV.-J. (Feb. 28, 2014, 7:26 PM) (alterations in original), 
https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/father-white-middle-school-students-suicide-related-
to-bullying/ [https://perma.cc/G5YP-KJGZ]. 
 17. Id. 
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Phoebe Prince, a twelve-year-old girl, was bullied in cyberspace.18  Her 
sister found her hanging by a scarf in a closet in her apartment.19  The day 
Phoebe took her own life, one of the bullies wrote the word “accomplished” 
on Phoebe’s Facebook page.20 
Ryan Halligan lost his life to cyberbullying.21  He committed suicide by 
hanging himself in the bathroom of his home.22 
Bullying is a continuing problem.23  More than one out of every five 
students report being bullied,24 more than 160,000 kids miss school each day 
due to fear of bullying,25 and bullying victims are “about 2.5 times as likely 
to try and kill themselves” as nonvictims.26  Studies suggest that involvement 
in bullying—as victim or bully—is associated with suicidal ideation and 
behavior.27 
Traditionally, bullying occurred within school walls.  In the 1990s, many 
popular television shows portrayed bullying as comedic.  Students would get 
pushed into lockers28 and the really unlucky ones would get their head 
thrown into a toilet (a “swirlie”).29  Unfortunately, the reality is that there is 
 
 18. Nancy Gibbs, When Bullying Goes Criminal, TIME (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1978773,00.html [https://perma.cc/ 
S5QE-JXZZ]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Dale Archer, Opinion, Phoebe Prince’s Death Is a Call to Action, FOX NEWS (Apr. 6, 
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/04/06/dr-dale-archer-phoebe-prince-south-
hadley-mass-bullying-death-da.html [https://perma.cc/DC7N-DAQT]. 
 21. Lisa Capretto, A Father’s Painful Crusade Against Bullying 12 Years After His Son’s 
Suicide, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2016, 1:17 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/john-halligan-ryan-suicide_us_57043f13e4b0537661880e93 [https://perma.cc/6F2F-
DH4N]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. “Bullying is certainly not a new problem.  Even a cursory look at ancient fairy tales 
such as Cinderella or classic literature like The Lord of the Flies reveals the timeless concern 
of harassers who leverage actual or perceived power to push others around repeatedly.” 
Matthew Fenn, Note, A Web of Liability:  Does New Cyberbullying Legislation Put Public 
Schools in a Sticky Situation?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729, 2735 (2013). 
 24. DEBORA LESSNE & CHRISTINA YANEZ, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT REPORTS OF 
BULLYING:  RESULTS FROM THE 2015 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2017/2017015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HKK5-TBW7]. 
 25. Eleanor Barkhorn, ‘160,000 Kids Stay Home From School Each Day to Avoid Being 
Bullied,’ ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/ 
160-000-kids-stay-home-from-school-each-day-to-avoid-being-bullied/280201/ 
[https://perma.cc/WM6Z-GGR9]. 
 26. Karen Kaplan, Teens Taunted by Bullies Are More Likely to Consider, Attempt 
Suicide, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/10/science/la-sci-
sn-bullying-cyberbullying-suicide-risk-20140310 [https://perma.cc/W3H4-CMSW]; see also 
Mitch van Geel et al., Relationship Between Peer Victimization, Cyberbullying, and Suicide 
in Children and Adolescents, 168 JAMA NETWORK 435, 438 (2014).  See generally Dimitrios 
Nikolaou, Does Cyberbullying Impact Youth Suicidal Behaviors?, 56 J. HEALTH ECON. 30 
(2017). 
 27. See generally Melissa K. Holt et al., Bullying and Suicidal Ideation and Behaviors:  A 
Meta-Analysis, 135 PEDIATRICS, Feb. 2015, at 1. 
 28. See Boy Meets World:  Back 2 School (ABC television broadcast Sept. 23, 1994). 
 29. See Hey Arnold!:  Big Gino (Nickelodeon television broadcast Mar. 15, 1999); 7th 
Heaven:  Saturday (The WB television broadcast Nov. 4, 1996). 
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nothing funny about bullying.  And, nowadays, bullying is no longer 
confined to school grounds. 
Today, cyberbullying is prevalent.30  “Cyberbullying” is bullying through 
the use of electronic technology such as cell phones, computers, and online 
messaging platforms.31  Cyberbullying commonly occurs through social 
media, text message, instant message, and email.32  Today, 77 percent of the 
U.S. population has a social media profile,33 and there are approximately 
2.46 billion social media users worldwide.34  Facebook has approximately 
two billion active users.35 
 
 30. See Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Lifetime Cyberbullying Victimization Rates, 
CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (Nov. 26, 2016), https://cyberbullying.org/summary-of-our-
cyberbullying-research [https://perma.cc/D7X3-MKCP]; Alexandra Topping, Cyberbullying:  
Increasing Number of Children Suffering, Says ChildLine, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2014, 9:16 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/08/cyberbullying-more-children-
affected-childline [https://perma.cc/H2SX-6D2R]; see also Steven M. Puiszis, “Tinkering” 
with the First Amendment’s Protection of Student Speech on the Internet, 29 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 167, 175 (2011) (“Today any student with a computer can post 
information on the Internet that can be accessed anywhere in the world, almost 
instantaneously.”). 
 31. “Cyberbullying includes sending, posting, or sharing negative, harmful, false, or mean 
content about someone else.” What Is Cyberbullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV, 
https://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/what-is-it/index.html [https://perma.cc/8HVH-
L89P] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 32. See id. 
 33. Percentage of U.S. Population with a Social Media Profile from 2008 to 2018, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-population-with-a-
social-network-profile/ [https://perma.cc/HT66-N7VU] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 34. Number of Social Media Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2021 (in Billions), STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/ 
[https://perma.cc/A2CR-EAX9] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); see also K. G. Coffman & A. M. 
Odlyzko, The Size and Growth Rate of the Internet, AT&T LABS-RES. (Oct. 2, 1998), 
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/internet.size.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RTJ-M27Y] 
(finding that, in the mid-1990s, the internet growth rate exploded over 100 percent per year). 
 35. If Facebook were a country, it would be the largest nation in the world. See Josh 
Constine, Facebook Now Has 2 Billion Monthly Users . . . and Responsibility, TECHCRUNCH 
(June 27, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/27/facebook-2-billion-users/ 
[https://perma.cc/E93F-V6KZ]; Conrad Hackett, Which 7 Countries Hold Half the World’s 
Population?, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/07/11/half-the-worlds-population-live-in-just-6-countries/ [https://perma.cc/ 
MW7T-K8VA]. 
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Cyberbullying has far-reaching consequences.36  “If someone is picking 
on you in the school yard, you can go home,”37 said the mother of a thirteen-
year-old boy who committed suicide with a shotgun after cyberbullies 
taunted him.  “When it’s on the computer at home, you have nowhere to 
go.”38 
Technological changes in the past twenty years—including the internet, 
cell phones, and social media—have extended the reach of off-campus 
speech,39 leading to parent complaints that this off-campus conduct disrupts 
the learning environment.40  These technological advancements have thus 
created new legal dilemmas for public school administrators who are 
considering disciplining students.41 
While school boards may have broad authority to define disciplinable 
conduct, they cannot abridge students’ First Amendment rights.42  
Interestingly, “student speech cases are among the most commonly litigated 
cases under the First Amendment.”43  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has 
not ruled on students’ First Amendment rights as to off-campus bullying 
speech. 
 
 36. Witold Walczak, legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of 
Pennsylvania explained, “For students, even though the speech may be protected there’s a big 
difference between whispering on a playground and posting on the Internet.  They need to 
understand you can cause real pain to people on the Internet.  The Internet just amplifies the 
speech, so the consequences are far greater.” Tim Grant, Bullies Take Intimidation to 
Cyberspace, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (June 26, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/life/lifestyle/2006/06/26/Bullies-take-intimidation-to-cyberspace/stories/ 
200606260090 [https://perma.cc/5CGM-LX5X]; see also Puiszis, supra note 30, at 174 (“The 
spoken or printed word is capable of reaching a finite audience.  Information posted on the 
Internet can reach a far larger audience potentially anywhere in the world.”). 
 37. Bob Meadows, The Web:  The Bully’s New Playground, PEOPLE (Mar. 14, 2005, 12:00 
PM), http://people.com/archive/the-web-the-bullys-new-playground-vol-63-no-10/ 
[https://perma.cc/YR3M-6KUA]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Donna L. Whiteman, Social Media and the Authority of Kansas School Districts 
to Discipline Students, 86 J. KAN. B. ASS’N, April 2017, at 24, 25, 30; see also Carolyn Joyce 
Mattus, Note, Is It Really My Space?:  Public Schools and Student Speech on the Internet After 
Layshock v. Hermitage School District and Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 16 B.U. 
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 318, 321 (2010) (“[L]ower courts are struggling to apply pre-Internet legal 
standards to student speech on the Internet because of substantial doubt as to how far school 
administrators’ authority extends—or should extend—over student speech made off-campus 
that reaches the school environment.”). 
 40. See Whiteman, supra note 39, at 31 (“Advancements in technology . . . ha[ve] resulted 
in school districts receiving increased numbers of complaints from students and parents 
concerning students’ off-campus social media speech that affects the school learning 
environment.”). 
 41. See id. at 25–31. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment:  A Comprehensive 
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011) (discussing how there are more student speech 
cases than cases “dealing with ‘obscenity, indecency, incitement to or advocacy of unlawful 
activity, defamation, commercial advertising, [and] campaign finance’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Frederick Shauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function:  Morse v. Frederick, 2007 
SUP. CT. REV. 205, 208)). 
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This Note addresses whether schools may discipline students for off-
campus bullying speech.  Specifically, it searches for the proper test for 
determining whether a school district has the regulatory authority to 
discipline a student for off-campus bullying speech without violating the 
First Amendment.  Part I provides background on the First Amendment, the 
role of public schools as state actors, and the contours of free speech 
protection in public schools as established by the Supreme Court.  Currently, 
courts are divided on whether schools may ever regulate off-campus speech 
and, if so, what threshold conditions must be met for that authority.  Part II 
analyzes how lower courts have approached this issue and describes the 
circuit split regarding the proper test for determining whether a school can 
discipline a student for off-campus speech.  Part III proposes a resolution to 
the circuit split by arguing that schools should have broad authority to 
regulate off-campus student speech.  Specifically, this Note argues that 
safety, efficiency, inadequate legal remedies, and fairness support affording 
this authority to school administrators. 
I.  STUDENT SPEECH REGULATION BY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
This Part discusses public schools’ legal authority to regulate student 
speech.  Part I.A provides background on the First Amendment of the 
Constitution and public schools as state actors.  Part I.B introduces four 
rationales that courts and scholars use to justify giving schools broad 
authority to regulate student behavior.  Part I.C introduces the existing 
Supreme Court precedent establishing the contours of free speech doctrine as 
applied to public schools. 
A.  As State Actors, Public Schools Are Subject to the First Amendment 
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”44  The First Amendment 
was designed to prevent previous restraints45 on expression.  In effect, the 
First Amendment promotes the free exchange of ideas46 and protects 
unpopular forms of speech.47  It even protects the expression of odious and 
 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment applies to the actions of state actors. See 
generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 45. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see also Estate of Hemingway 
v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968) (“The essential thrust of the First 
Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it 
shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet.”). 
 46. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail.”). 
 47. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”); Abner Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253, 1253 (2011) 
(“Why we have such firm protection for speech we abhor is a matter of much debate.  To some 
extent, it’s because we don’t trust the state to make content-based judgments consistently as a 
matter of principle; we fear that too often it will be merely playing favorites, helping friends 
and harming enemies.”). 
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noxious ideas.48  And while “the immediate consequence of this freedom 
may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive 
utterance,” the First Amendment is essential to prevent “empower[ing] a 
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.”49 
Public schools are state actors primarily because they are run by the state.50  
As a result, students in public schools are afforded First Amendment 
protections.  In contrast, private schools, by their very nature, are not state 
actors.  Therefore, students in private schools are not afforded the same First 
Amendment protections as students in public schools.51  For example, just 
last year, Harvard University rescinded offers to students who posted 
offensive memes online.52  Those students did not have First Amendment 
recourse because Harvard University is a private university.53  Public school 
students are still afforded First Amendment protections, despite the broad 
regulatory authority conferred on public schools. 
 
 48. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011) (finding that the First Amendment 
protects signs bearing messages such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “You’re Going 
to Hell” at a former marine’s funeral); id. at 468 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing that the First 
Amendment protects a press release stating “God Almighty killed” a former marine and that 
the former marine “died in shame, not honor—for a fag nation cursed by God . . . .  Now in 
Hell—sine die.” (alteration in original)). 
 49. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–26 (1971) (holding that the defendant could not, 
consistently with the First Amendment, be punished for wearing a jacket in court that read 
“fuck the draft”).  “[T]he freedom of Speech may be taken away—and, dumb & silent we may 
be led, like sheep, to the Slaughter.” Letter from George Washington to Officers of the Army 
(Mar. 15, 1783), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-10840 
[https://perma.cc/TR5Q-SJR8]. 
 50. The legal control of public education resides with the state. STEPHEN B. THOMAS ET 
AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW:  TEACHERS’ AND STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 2 (6th ed. 2009).  State 
constitutions and statutes enacted by state legislatures often describe, in very vague and 
general terms, the ways schools should be governed. See MICHAEL IMBER ET AL., EDUCATION 
LAW 2 (5th ed. 2014); MICHAEL IMBER & TYLL VAN GEEL, EDUCATION LAW 3 (2d ed. 2000) 
(discussing how “state constitutions contain vague language stating that there shall be 
schools”).  “The specificity of statutes governing the operation of public schools varies from 
state to state,” but most state laws create local school districts and give school boards the 
authority to raise taxes, borrow money, hire and fire teachers, determine the curriculum, and 
discipline pupils. KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL 
LAW 3 (6th ed. 2005); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d(b) (2017) (“Each local and 
regional board of education shall develop and implement a safe school climate plan to address 
the existence of bullying . . . in its schools.”); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 10–18 (2018) (providing 
policies and guidelines for the board of education and requiring that every school district craft 
policies and guidelines intended to create a school environment free from discrimination or 
harassment); cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (“Each 
locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs.”). 
 51. Safia Samee Ali, Harvard Revokes Admission of Several Students for Posting 
‘Offensive’ Memes, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/harvard-revokes-admission-several-students-posting-offensive-memes-n768361 
[https://perma.cc/UV3F-FLPR]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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B.  Public Schools’ Regulatory Authority Is Broad 
While public schools have no inherent powers,54 the Supreme Court views 
public education as “perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.”55  Traditionally, courts have conferred considerable deference 
to schools because schools were viewed as acting in loco parentis.56  But new 
developments in the past four decades have led many courts to abandon the 
in loco parentis justification.57 
Today, courts still give public school officials broad authority to regulate 
student speech.  In fact, for a span of forty years (from February 1969 to June 
2009), school authorities prevailed in every constitutional challenge brought 
by a student that made it to the Supreme Court.58 
Courts and scholars provide several reasons why schools should have 
broad authority to regulate student speech.  First, when public school officials 
regulate student speech, the state is acting in a managerial capacity.59  And 
when the state acts in a managerial capacity with respect to certain key 
functions, like public education, it is entitled to greater authority to regulate 
speech.60 
Second, judges and scholars often distinguish the rights of students from 
those of adults.  They reason that “[w]hat may be wholly permissible for 
 
 54. The authority to operate public schools must be found in either the express or implied 
terms of statutes. ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 50, at 3. 
 55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 56. See IMBER, supra note 50, at 98 (“Courts commonly viewed the school as operating 
in the place of parents (in loco parentis).  This doctrine justified all manner of regulation, just 
as true parenthood confers broad powers.”). 
 57. See id. (“Courts have acknowledged that for most purposes it is more appropriate to 
view the school as an arm of the state rather than as a substitute parent.”). 
 58. Douglas E. Abrams, Recognizing the Public Schools’ Authority to Discipline 
Students’ Off-Campus Cyberbullying of Classmates, 37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 181, 202 (2011); see Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, Still Judging School 
Discipline, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE:  THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION 238, 249 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009) (“[C]ourts in general 
have become less favorable to student claims in court.”); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (recognizing the “comprehensive authority” of 
teachers and other public school officials).  But see J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. 
Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The authority of public school officials is not 
boundless.”). 
 59. State action regarding speech varies with the type of power the government is 
exercising.  For example, private speech receives the greatest speech protection, and therefore 
general regulation of private speech is heavily scrutinized.  But when the state acts in the 
capacity of manager of public schools, it has broader authority than when regulating private 
speech more generally. See Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) 
(discussing how First Amendment doctrine within managerial domains differs fundamentally 
from First Amendment doctrine within public discourse). 
 60. See Barry McDonald, Regulating Student Cyberspeech, 77 MO. L. REV. 727, 731 
(2012) (“[W]hen the government acts in certain capacities to accomplish functions assigned 
to it by the people . . . such as . . . educating much of America’s youth, the Court sensibly 
gives the government more latitude to regulate speech as necessary to effectively perform and 
accomplish its assigned functions.”); see also Post, supra note 59, at 164 (“[T]he state can 
regulate speech within public educational institutions so as to achieve the purposes of 
education; it can regulate speech within the judicial system so as to attain the ends of justice; 
[and] it can regulate speech within the military so as to preserve the national defense . . . .”). 
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adults . . . may not be so for children,”61 and therefore “[t]he constitutional 
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the 
rights of adults”62—or of children in other settings. 
Third, schools are state actors tasked with creating safe learning 
environments.63  And fourth, students’ First Amendment rights must be 
tempered by “society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”64  This need of balancing First 
Amendment rights with society’s countervailing interests has not been 
limited to students.  In fact, the Supreme Court has found that the First 
Amendment provides no protection or limited protection to certain categories 
of speech because they have such little social value.65 
C.  Supreme Court Cases Establish the Free Speech Doctrine’s Contours 
as Applied to Public Schools 
The Supreme Court has deemed several categories of speech to be so 
harmful or so lacking in value as to be outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.66  When a person’s speech fits within one of these categories 
 
 61. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944). 
 62. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); see McDonald, supra 
note 60, at 738 (distinguishing between ordinary free speech principles that govern the speech 
of general citizens and the less speech-protective rules that govern student speech); see also 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995) (“[T]he nature 
of [the State’s power over schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of 
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults. . . .  [Children’s] Fourth 
Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public 
schools than elsewhere . . . .”); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 
F.3d 668, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[H]igh-school students are not adults, schools are not 
public meeting halls, children are in school to be taught by adults rather than to practice 
attacking each other with wounding words, and school authorities have a protective 
relationship and responsibility to all the students.”).  But see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 
487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools.”). 
 63. See Abrams, supra note 58, at 201 (“[S]tudents’ constitutional rights may be limited 
because ‘“special needs” inhere in the public school context,’ ‘where the State is responsible 
for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829–30 (2002))); see also Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 672 (“Mutual respect and 
forbearance enforced by the school may well be essential to the maintenance of a minimally 
decorous atmosphere for learning.”). 
 64. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681–83 (“The process of educating our youth for citizenship in 
public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must 
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. . . .  The schools . . . may 
determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school 
that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech.”). 
 65. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (discussing certain 
categories of speech that have so little social value and are “outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality”). 
 66. See id. at 571–72 (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”). 
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the First Amendment generally offers no protection.67  These categories 
include true threats,68 fighting words,69 obscenity,70 child pornography,71 
solicitations to commit crimes,72 speech that incites imminent lawless 
action,73 defamation and libel,74 and commercial speech at times.75  
Interestingly, courts generally have not applied these First Amendment 
carveouts to students.  Instead, the Supreme Court has established a separate 
doctrine for regulating student speech.76 
Part I.C.1 discusses the Supreme Court cases that outline the four types of 
student speech that schools may restrict.  Part I.C.2 focuses on Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District,77 the leading authority on 
the issue of whether schools may regulate on-campus student speech,78 
which has been widely applied to cases involving off-campus student speech 
regulation.79 
 
 67. Puiszis, supra note 30, at 176–84; see also Bethany Poppelreiter, Note, When Words 
Are Weapons:  Using Tinker and Premises Liability Doctrine to Keep Schools Safe in a Digital 
Age, 86 MISS. L.J. 643, 648 (2017). 
 68. E.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (holding that a state may ban 
cross burning with the intent to intimidate without running afoul of the First Amendment); 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (“What is a threat must be 
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.”); D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. 
Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764–65 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying the “true threat” test to instant 
messages sent from one student, at home, to another student). 
 69. E.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568 (holding that “fighting words” are not protected 
under the First Amendment). 
 70. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“[O]bscene material is unprotected 
by the First Amendment.”). 
 71. E.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 299 (2008) (“[O]ffers to provide or 
requests to obtain child pornography are categorically excluded from the First Amendment.”); 
New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982). 
 72. E.g., Williams, 553 U.S. at 297 (“Offers to engage in illegal transactions are 
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”). 
 73. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees 
of free speech . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”). 
 74. See generally, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 75. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) 
(outlining the four-part test courts use to determine when restrictions on commercial speech 
violate the First Amendment).  Under Central Hudson, commercial speech is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny which directs courts to consider:  (1) whether the expression at issue 
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) “whether the asserted governmental interest 
is substantial”; (3) “whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted”; and (4) “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” 
Id. at 566. 
 76. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 77. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 78. “Tinker sets the general rule for regulating school speech, and that rule is subject to 
several narrow exceptions [defined by Tinker’s progeny].” J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 927 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 79. See, e.g., C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016); Kowalski 
v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573–74 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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1.  Student Speech Cases 
Students have First Amendment protections and cannot be punished 
merely for expressing their personal views about political issues on school 
premises.80  As the Supreme Court opined, “It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”81  But over time, the Court 
has restricted certain types of permissible student speech in public schools, 
thereby giving schools authority to regulate such speech. 
The four landmark Supreme Court cases outlining when student speech 
may be regulated are Tinker,82 Bethel School District v. Fraser,83 Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier,84 and Morse v. Frederick.85  Together, Tinker 
and its progeny cover four types of student speech that schools may regulate:  
(1) speech causing a “substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities”;86 (2) “offensively lewd and indecent speech”;87 
(3) school-sponsored student publications;88 and (4) speech “advocating or 
promoting illegal drug use.”89 
2.  Tinker 
In Tinker, three students wore black armbands to school “to publicize their 
objections to the hostilities in Vietnam.”90  School administrators suspended 
the students.91  Through their parents, the students sued the school district for 
 
 80. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (“When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or 
on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial 
subjects . . . if he does so without ‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding 
with the rights of others.” (alteration in original) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 
749 (5th Cir. 1966))); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, 
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))). 
 81. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The 
vigilant protection of constitutional freedom is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American schools.”). 
 82. 393 U.S. at 503. 
 83. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 84. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 85. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 86. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 87. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (justifying the regulation of student expression on campus or 
otherwise during school-sponsored activities). 
 88. Hazelwood involves speech that was produced in a journalism class and thus falls 
under “school as educator” rather than “school as regulator of student speech.” See 484 U.S. 
at 271 (“[E]xpressive activities that students, parents, [or] members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school [may be regulated by the school 
administration].”). 
 89. Morse, 551 U.S. at 394. 
 90. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 91. Id. 
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violating their rights of expression.92  The Supreme Court held that the 
regulation,93 which prohibited students from wearing armbands to school and 
suspended those who did, was an unconstitutional denial of students’ right of 
expression of opinion.94  The Court explained, “the record does not 
demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to 
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact 
occurred.”95 
Tinker, which was decided almost fifty years ago, outlined the two-part 
substantive test courts use to determine when speech may be regulated in 
public schools.96  The test allows school authorities to regulate student 
expression if school authorities have reason to anticipate that the expression 
would (1) substantially interfere with the work of the school,97 or (2) impinge 
upon the rights of other students.98  Once a court decides that the Tinker 
substantial-disruption standard applies, “actual or reasonably forecasted 
disruption of school functions from the disputed speech is sufficient to 
support sanctioning it.”99  Currently, circuit courts are divided as to whether 
Tinker’s test applies to off-campus student speech.100 
 
 92. Id. at 504, 506. 
 93. “The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan to wear 
armbands” and subsequently “adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school 
would be asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he returned without 
the armband.” Id. at 504. 
 94. Id. at 504, 510–11. 
 95. Id. at 514. 
 96. Id. at 509, 514.  Technically, the “Tinker test” is dictum because the Court held that 
the school authorities violated the students’ First Amendment rights. 
 97. “The substantial disruption inquiry is highly fact-intensive.  Perhaps for that reason, 
existing case law has not provided clear guidelines as to when a substantial disruption is 
reasonably foreseeable.  There is, for example, no magic number of students or classrooms 
that must be affected by the speech.” J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist. 711 
F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  A substantial disruption requires something “more 
than some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech” but need not rise to the level of 
“complete chaos.” J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa. 
2002). 
 98. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; see also John T. Ceglia, Comment, The Disappearing 
Schoolhouse Gate:  Applying Tinker in the Internet Age, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 939, 947–48 (2012) 
(discussing the two-pronged rule). 
 99. McDonald, supra note 60, at 737; see Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 
2008) (holding that Tinker does not require “actual disruption to justify a restraint on student 
speech”); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Tinker does not require 
school officials to wait until the horse has left the barn before closing the door. . . .  Tinker 
does not require certainty, only that the forecast of substantial disruption be reasonable.”). 
 100. “Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Tinker’s applicability is somewhat 
unclear, stating that ‘[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts 
should apply school speech precedents.’” Susan S. Bendlin, Far from the Classroom, the 
Cafeteria, and the Playing Field:  Why Should the School’s Disciplinary Arm Reach Speech 
Made in a Student’s Bedroom?, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 195, 196–97 (2011) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007)). 
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II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING PUBLIC SCHOOL AUTHORITY TO 
REGULATE OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT SPEECH 
Circuit courts have been responsible for addressing off-campus speech 
without guidance from the Supreme Court.101  As a result, these courts have 
differed in their approaches to the question of whether schools have the 
authority to regulate students’ off-campus speech.102 
This Part analyzes the different approaches courts use to determine 
whether schools have the regulatory authority to discipline students for their 
off-campus speech.  Some courts hold that schools may never regulate off-
campus speech and, therefore, that Tinker’s test for regulating student speech 
does not apply to off-campus speech.103  A second group of courts holds that 
schools may sometimes regulate off-campus speech.104  These courts apply 
Tinker’s test only after a threshold jurisdictional inquiry.105  A third group of 
courts holds that schools always have the authority to regulate off-campus 
speech and that Tinker is the only test needed to determine when schools may 
discipline students for off-campus speech.106 
A.  Schools May Never Regulate Off-Campus Speech:  Tinker Does Not 
Apply to Off-Campus Speech 
Some courts refuse to apply Tinker to off-campus speech.107  These courts 
have established a bright-line rule along geographical lines—the 
“geographical-nexus” test.108  If speech originates off campus then schools 
cannot regulate the speech.109  Therefore, off-campus speech will never be 
subject to the Tinker test.  Instead, general First Amendment principles would 
apply.110 
 
 101. But see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which 
for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion 
of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom 
of speech.”); Puiszis, supra note 30, at 172 (“Because the Court’s analysis in Tinker applies 
to conduct ‘in class or out of it,’ Tinker is broad enough to encompass Internet speech.”). 
 102. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 937 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Smith, J., concurring); see also Bendlin, supra note 100, at 218–19 (discussing how courts 
apply different analytical approaches including the geographic approach, the sufficient-nexus 
approach, the reasonably foreseeable approach, and the intent or aimed-at-the-school 
approach). 
 103. See infra Part II.A. 
 104. See infra Part II.B. 
 105. See infra Part II.B. 
 106. See infra Part II.C. 
 107. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 108. See Ceglia, supra note 98, at 959. 
 109. See Porter, 393 F.3d at 620; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050. 
 110. Under general First Amendment principles, students would be treated as ordinary 
citizens and their speech would only be regulated if it falls into one of the general excludable 
carveouts like true threats. See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment:  
Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 276 (2001) 
(“When off-campus, society must view minors not in what amounts to their occupational 
status as students—minors play the role of student, just as if they went to work on a job—but 
in their status as citizens of the United States.”). 
2018] OFF-CAMPUS BULLYING SPEECH 685 
The Fifth Circuit adopted this approach in Porter v. Ascension Parish 
School Board,111 where it held that a school district could not punish a 
student for a violent drawing depicting his school “under a state of siege by 
a gasoline tanker truck, missile launcher, helicopter, and various armed 
persons.”112  The court reasoned that the picture could not be considered on-
campus speech, or even speech directed at the campus, because the student 
never intended for the picture to reach the campus and took no action to bring 
it to school.113  As a result, the court did not apply Tinker’s less protective 
standard and instead applied general First Amendment principles.114 
The Second Circuit, in Thomas v. Board of Education,115 similarly chose 
not to apply Tinker to off-campus speech116 when school officials “ventured 
out of the school yard and into the general community where the freedom 
accorded expression is at its zenith.”117  The Second Circuit stated that school 
officials are granted “substantial autonomy within their academic domain” 
and that this power “rests in part on the confinement of that power within the 
metes and bounds of the school itself.”118  The court found that the conduct 
in that case, the publication of a magazine parody, “was conceived, executed, 
and distributed outside the school,” so school officials had exceeded their 
powers when they punished the students for this out-of-school conduct.119 
Judge D. Brooks Smith of the Third Circuit came to a similar conclusion 
in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District.120  He wrote 
separately in a concurring opinion to address whether Tinker applies to off-
campus speech.121  He stated that it does not “and that the First Amendment 
protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects 
speech by citizens in the community at large.”122 
There are certain disadvantages to applying this geographical-nexus 
test.123  Most obviously, it is difficult for school administrators to apply it 
 
 111. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 112. Id. at 611, 615, 620 (holding that Tinker does not apply to students’ off-campus 
speech). 
 113. Id. at 615. 
 114. See id. at 616–18 (applying general First Amendment principles). 
 115. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 116. Id. at 1050, 1053 n.18 (distinguishing Tinker in a case involving a publication printed 
outside the school). 
 117. Id. at 1050. 
 118. Id. at 1052. 
 119. Id. at 1050. 
 120. 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 936, 939 (“Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would create a precedent with 
ominous implications.  Doing so would empower schools to regulate students’ expressive 
activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves—so 
long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”); see also Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (“It would be an unseemly and 
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s 
home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that child when 
he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”). 
 123. On-campus and off-campus distinctions should not determine whether schools may 
regulate student speech, “just as a defendant’s location is no longer the sole determinant of 
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when speech is in cyberspace.124  How will school administrators know 
where the student was when he posted on Facebook or sent a text message to 
a classmate?  The advent of technologies like the internet, cell phones, and 
social media, “and their sweeping adoption by students present new and 
evolving challenges for school administrators, confounding previously 
delineated boundaries of permissible regulations.”125  The internet makes it 
nearly impossible to draw a line between on- and off-campus speech.  
Therefore, a geographical boundary is arguably not the best solution.126  It 
seems that the “‘schoolhouse gate’ cannot exist in a world where speech is 
electronic, intangible, and can be instantly transmitted and accessed.”127 
B.  Schools May Sometimes Regulate Off-Campus Speech:  Tinker Applies 
if the School Satisfies Some Threshold Jurisdictional Test 
Most circuit courts that consider the issue of whether schools may regulate 
off-campus speech conclude that some form of threshold “jurisdictional” test 
must be met before the Tinker standard is applied to off-campus speech.128 
This section explores the different treatment of this issue among the 
Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit courts.  The Fourth Circuit and Eighth 
Circuit apply Tinker only after threshold standards have been met.  They 
differ, however, in which threshold tests they use.  The Fourth Circuit applies 
a nexus test, which looks at how closely the offending speech is tied to the 
school, while the Eighth Circuit asks if it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
 
whether a state can reach him.” Rashmi Joshi, Comment, Sharing the Digital Sandbox:  The 
Effects of Ubiquitous Computing on Student Speech and Cyberbullying Jurisprudence, 53 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 629, 653 (2013) (“Overturning the rigid geographical analysis of 
Pennoyer, the Court stated in International Shoe that a state may have jurisdiction over a 
defendant if said defendant has certain minimum contacts within the state, and . . . if the suit 
does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”). 
 124. See McDonald, supra note 60, at 746 (“[I]n truth[,] cyberspace knows no geographic 
boundaries and cybercommunications are much more pervasive, enduring and easy to engage 
in than communications in the ‘physical’ world.”). 
 125. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 392 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 126. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 598 
(W.D. Pa. 2007) (“It is clear that the test for school authority is not geographical. . . .  [S]chools 
have an undoubted ability to govern student conduct at school-sponsored field trips, sporting 
events, academic competitions and during transit to and from such activities.”), aff’d in part 
on reh’g en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d. Cir. 2011). 
 127. Ceglia, supra note 98, at 976. 
 128. C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing how 
federal courts first consider “the threshold question of whether the school could permissibly 
regulate the student’s off-campus speech at all”); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified 
Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Some courts . . . have considered 
the location of the speech to be an important threshold issue for the court to resolve before 
applying the Supreme Court’s student speech precedents.”); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem 
Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002) (discussing that a court must determine if speech 
was on-campus speech subject to Tinker or off-campus speech “which would arguably be 
subject to some higher level of First Amendment protection”); McDonald, supra note 60, at 
736 (“[Most federal courts of appeals] concluded that some form of threshold standard must 
be met before the Tinker standard, rather than ordinary free speech principles, applied to the 
case.”). 
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speech will reach the school.129  Refusing to pick one, the Ninth Circuit 
applies both threshold tests. 
1.  The Fourth Circuit’s “Sufficient-Nexus” Test 
The Fourth Circuit uses a “sufficient-nexus” threshold test to determine 
whether schools may discipline students for their off-campus bullying 
speech.  In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,130 Kara Kowalski, a high 
school senior, was suspended from school for creating and posting to a 
MySpace webpage that was largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow 
student.131  Kowalski commenced an action against the Berkeley County 
School District, contending that the school district violated her free speech 
rights under the First Amendment.132  Kowalski alleged that “the School 
District was not justified in regulating her speech because it did not occur 
during a ‘school-related activity,’ but rather was ‘private out-of-school 
speech.’”133  The Fourth Circuit admitted that Kowalski pushed her 
computer’s keys in her home, but explained that she knew that the webpage 
and her posts could reasonably be expected to reach the school.134  The court 
recognized that there is a limit to the scope of a school’s interest “in the order, 
safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue originates 
outside the schoolhouse gate,”135 but the court was satisfied that there was a 
“sufficient nexus”136 between the offending speech and the school’s 
pedagogical interests to justify the action taken by school officials.137  The 
court reasoned, “[E]very aspect of the webpage’s design and implementation 
was school-related.  Kowalski designed the website for ‘students,’ . . . she 
sent it to students inviting them to join; and those who joined were mostly 
students.”138  The court used the word “nexus” again:  “Suffice it to hold here 
that, where such speech has a sufficient nexus with the school, the 
Constitution is not written to hinder school administrators’ good faith efforts 
to address the problem.”139 
 
 129. Whether it is reasonably foreseeable that speech will reach the school is a different 
question from Tinker’s question, which asks whether school authorities could anticipate that 
expression would substantially interfere with the work of the school. 
 130. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 131. Id. at 567. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 573 (“Kowalski indeed pushed her computer’s keys in her home, but she knew 
that the electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home and could 
reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the school environment.”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 577. 
 137. Id. at 573 (“[W]e are satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to Musselman High 
School’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school 
officials in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.”). 
 138. Id. at 576. 
 139. Id. at 577. 
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2.  The Eighth Circuit’s “Reasonably Foreseeable” Test 
The Eighth Circuit uses a reasonably foreseeable threshold test to 
determine whether schools may discipline students for their off-campus 
internet speech.140  In S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School 
District,141 twin brothers were suspended from their school because they 
created a blog142 where they posted offensive, racist, sexist, and degrading 
comments about particular classmates.143  The court held that Tinker applied 
to the off-campus online speech because it was reasonably foreseeable that 
the speech would reach the school or affect its environment.144  The court 
explained that it was reasonably foreseeable that the blog posts would be 
brought to the attention of school authorities because the posts were “targeted 
at” the school and even accessed by students on school computers.145 
3.  The Ninth Circuit’s Application of Both Threshold Tests 
The Ninth Circuit has not adopted one specific threshold test to determine 
whether schools may discipline students for their off-campus speech.  
Instead, it applies both threshold tests. 
In Wynar ex rel. Wynar v. Douglas County School District,146 the Ninth 
Circuit held that school officials did not violate Landon Wynar’s First 
Amendment rights by expelling him for sending threatening messages about 
planning a school shooting from his home to his friends.147  The court noted 
that some circuits apply threshold tests in determining whether schools may 
regulate off-campus speech.  The court explained that “the Fourth Circuit 
requires that the speech have a sufficient ‘nexus’ to the school, while the 
Eighth Circuit requires that it be ‘reasonably foreseeable that the speech will 
reach the school community.’”148  The Ninth Circuit refused “to try and craft 
a one-size fits all approach” and declined to choose between the two 
threshold tests.149  Instead, the court applied both tests and held that both 
were satisfied in the case of a threatened school shooting.150  The court 
explained that, “[g]iven the subject and addresses of Landon’s messages, it 
is hard to imagine how their nexus to the school could have been more direct; 
 
 140. See generally, e.g., S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 
771 (8th Cir. 2012); D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 141. 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 142. The blog was called “NorthPress” and it was named after Lee’s Summit North High 
School. Id. at 773. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 778 (“[T]he NorthPress posts ‘could reasonably be expected to reach the school 
or impact the environment.’” (quoting Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 147. Id. at 1064, 1070. 
 148. Id. at 1068 (citation omitted) (first quoting Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573; then quoting 
S.J.W., 696 F.3d at 777). 
 149. Id. at 1069. 
 150. Id. 
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for the same reasons, it should have been reasonably foreseeable to Landon 
that his messages would reach campus.”151 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J152 did not 
choose just one test to apply to off-campus speech.153  Rather, it concluded, 
“under either [threshold] test, the School District had the authority to 
discipline C.R. for his off-campus speech.”154 
In this case, the court considered whether a school may discipline a student 
for off-campus sexual harassment.155  It was a matter of first impression.  In 
the case, C.R., a twelve-year-old boy, sexually harassed two disabled 
students while the students walked home from school.156  As a result, the 
school suspended C.R. for two days.157  C.R.’s parents challenged his 
suspension under the First Amendment and argued that the school lacked this 
disciplinary authority because the harassment occurred off campus in a 
public park.158  The Ninth Circuit noted that there were no “directly 
analogous decisions from any other circuit” and that “the vast majority of the 
law . . . concerns . . . internet speech.”159  Following its precedent in Wynar, 
the court applied both the nexus and reasonably foreseeable tests.160 
The harassing speech satisfied the sufficient-nexus test because (1) all of 
the individuals involved were students, (2) “the incident took place on a path 
that begins at the schoolhouse door,” (3) the school’s dismissal schedule 
“brought the students together on the bike path,” and (4) “it is a reasonable 
exercise of the School District’s in loco parentis authority to be concerned 
with its students’ well being as they begin their homeward journey at the end 
of the school day.”161 
The harassment speech satisfied the reasonably foreseeable test because 
(1) “administrators could reasonably expect the harassment’s effects to spill 
over into the school environment,” and (2) “[a]dministrators could also 
reasonably expect students to discuss the harassment in school.”162  The court 
explained that “a student who is routinely subject to harassment while 
walking home from school may be distracted during school hours by the 
prospect of the impending harassment.”163 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 153. Id. at 1150–51. 
 154. Id. at 1150. 
 155. Id. at 1145. 
 156. Id. at 1146. 
 157. Id. at 1147. 
 158. Id. at 1145–46. 
 159. Id. at 1150. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1150–51 (“Although the harassment at issue in this case took place off school 
property, it was closely tied to the school.”). 
 162. Id. at 1151. 
 163. Id. 
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4.  The Limitations of Threshold Tests 
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits require schools to overcome threshold tests 
that are poorly defined, confusing, inefficient, and redundant.  The Fourth 
Circuit’s sufficient-nexus threshold test, which asks whether a student’s off-
campus speech was tied closely enough to the school to permit its 
regulation,164 has its limitations.  First, the Fourth Circuit does not provide 
clear guidance as to what constitutes a “sufficient nexus.”165  Second, the test 
is confusing because different courts use different versions of the sufficient-
nexus test.166 
The Eighth Circuit’s reasonably foreseeable threshold test, which asks 
whether it was reasonably foreseeable that off-campus speech would reach 
the school,167 is unclear and almost always satisfied.  It is unclear because in 
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson, the court did not specify who must be able to 
reasonably foresee that speech will reach the school.168  Instead, the court 
relied on language from other courts without specifying whether the test 
should be employed from the vantage point of a reasonable person, the 
student wrongdoer, the student victim, or school authorities.169  As a result, 
courts are applying the threshold test from different vantage points.  In 
Wynar, the Ninth Circuit applied the Eighth Circuit’s reasonably foreseeable 
threshold test from the bully’s vantage point—the court stated that “it should 
have been reasonably foreseeable to Landon” that his bullying speech would 
reach the school.170  In contrast, in C.R., the Ninth Circuit applied the Eighth 
 
 164. See supra notes 130–39 and accompanying text. 
 165. One lower court has admitted, “It is unclear, however, when such a nexus exists.” J.C. 
ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 166. Compare Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 
600 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that a nexus was not established because there were several gaps 
in the causation link between the speech and a disruption), aff’d in part on reh’g en banc, 650 
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), and Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. 650 F.3d 205, 
221 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring) (“Speech that neither relates to school nor 
occurs on campus or during a school sanctioned event will in all likelihood lack a reasonable 
nexus to school . . . .”), with J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 
2008 WL 4279517, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008) (“The facts that we are presented with 
establish much more of a connection between the off-campus action and on-campus effect.  
The website addresses the principal of the school.  Its intended audience is students at the 
school.  A paper copy of the website was brought into school, and the website was discussed 
in school.  The picture on the profile was appropriated from the school district’s website.”), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on reh’g en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), and J.S. ex rel. H.S. 
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865–67 (Pa. 2002) (finding that a nexus was 
established because the speech was aimed at a specific audience of students and the website 
was accessed at school). 
 167. See supra notes 140–45 and accompanying text. 
 168. S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 
2012) (“[The online posts] could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact [its] 
environment.”). 
 169. See id. at 777 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 170. Wynar ex rel. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
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Circuit’s reasonably foreseeable threshold test from the school 
administrators’ vantage point.171 
Another limitation of the reasonably foreseeable threshold test is that it 
will almost always be foreseeable that student internet speech regarding 
school issues will reach the school audience.172  Moreover, even noninternet 
speech regarding nonschool issues will be within the school’s jurisdiction so 
long as the bully and the victim go to the same school.173  For these reasons, 
it would be more efficient174 for courts to go straight to Tinker’s test and ask 
whether school authorities could reasonably forecast a “substantial disruption 
of or material interference with school activities.”175 
C.  Schools May Always Regulate Off-Campus Speech: 
Tinker Applies to Off-Campus Speech 
Many courts analyzing off-campus speech that is subsequently brought to 
campus or to the attention of school authorities apply Tinker regardless of 
where the speech originated.176  These courts apply Tinker to speech that 
originates both on and off campus without first applying a threshold test.177  
Under this approach, speech’s geographic origin is not relevant.178 
 
 171. C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]dministrators 
could reasonably expect the harassment’s effects to spill over into the school environment.”). 
 172. Anything published in cyberspace could ultimately end up at school by means of a 
phone, iPad, or computer. See Lindsay J. Gower, Note, Blue Mountain School District v. J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder:  Will the Supreme Court Provide Clarification for Public School Officials 
Regarding Off-Campus Internet Speech?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 709, 730 (2013) (“The target of 
most student Internet speech will be the students’ friends—those who are most likely to 
understand and appreciate the speech and who are likely to also be students at the school.”). 
 173. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 174. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 175. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 176. See, e.g., Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970–71 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(applying Tinker where a student-created underground newspaper was authored and 
distributed off campus, but some of the newspapers turned up on campus); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. 
Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[T]he 
majority of courts will apply Tinker where speech originating off campus is brought to school 
or to the attention of school authorities, whether by the author himself or some other means.”); 
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (applying 
Tinker where a student composed a degrading top-ten list and distributed it off campus to 
friends via email, but one recipient subsequently printed and carried it onto school grounds); 
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (applying 
Tinker to a website created by a student off campus that criticized the school administration 
where another student accessed the website at school and showed it to a teacher); see also 
McDonald, supra note 60, at 736 (“[T]he Tinker standard applied regardless of where the 
student speech occurred as long as it somehow made its way onto campus.”). 
 177. Put another way, some courts treat Tinker’s substantial-disruption prong as the 
threshold jurisdictional test.  This approach merges the jurisdictional question (whether 
schools may regulate speech generally) with the merits question (whether schools may 
regulate the speech in a particular instance). 
 178. McDonald, supra note 60, at 736 (discussing how some federal district courts take the 
approach that the geographic location of student speech is immaterial); see LaVine v. Blaine 
Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988–92 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing the speech under Tinker without 
giving any consideration to the fact that the poem was written outside of school); J.C. ex rel. 
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Opponents of this approach include those who, despite believing schools 
should teach students not to bully,179 insist that disciplining students for off-
campus speech simply goes too far.180  Additionally, many scholars have 
criticized this approach by pointing out that there are sufficient remedies and 
redress in the civil181 and criminal182 justice systems.  These scholars argue 
that students would unfairly “face two sets of punishments:  liability in court 
for civil or criminal violations and school discipline.”183  Others criticize this 
approach as interfering with parents’ fundamental liberty interest in raising 
their children.184 
Courts are clearly divided on whether schools may regulate students’ off-
campus speech.  While some courts hold that schools may either always or 
never regulate off-campus speech, the majority of courts allow regulation 
only when various threshold tests are satisfied. 
III.  TINKER AS BOTH A THRESHOLD JURISDICTIONAL TEST 
AND A SUBSTANTIVE TEST 
As discussed in Part II, circuit courts do not know how to evaluate whether 
schools can discipline students for off-campus speech.  Consequently, 
victims of bullying have minimal protections or recourse for off-campus 
bullying.  The Supreme Court must step in and provide guidance for 
addressing off-campus bullying speech. 
This Note argues that Tinker should be applied as both a threshold 
jurisdictional test and a substantive test.185  Under this approach, schools 
would be allowed to regulate off-campus student speech when school 
 
R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (“[U]nder the majority rule . . . the geographic origin of the 
speech is not material; Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-campus speech.”). 
 179. The government has differentiated roles.  Schools are afforded great latitude and 
flexibility when it comes to choosing curriculums and lesson plans because the school is 
viewed as an educator.  Therefore, schools can choose to teach students about bullying. See 
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 910 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[A]ctions by the 
government as educator do not raise the same First Amendment concerns as actions by the 
government as sovereign.”). 
 180. See supra notes 110–22 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., Calvert, supra note 110, at 245 (“[I]f traditional and generally applicable off-
campus civil law remedies such as libel are available for teachers and principals who feel 
defamed by student speech that originates off campus, then why should school administrators 
be able to mete out a second, in-school punishment against those students?”). 
 182. See, e.g., id. (“[I]f generally applicable criminal threat statutes exist to punish students 
for off-campus expression that allegedly menaces school personnel or other students, why 
should a school be able to double-dip and punish those students as well?”). 
 183. See Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous 
Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 144 (2003). 
 184. “[T]he custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue 
interference by the state, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child.” Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Caplan, supra note 183, at 144 
(discussing how off-campus student behavior is not within the jurisdiction of the school, but 
is largely within the jurisdiction of parents). 
 185. This approach accepts that schools have the authority to discipline students for off-
campus speech.  And because private schools may discipline students for off-campus speech, 
this approach would put public school administrators on the same playing field as private 
school administrators. 
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authorities could reasonably forecast a “substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities.”186  In this way, students’ off-campus 
speech would be treated as an additional carveout to the First Amendment.  
But, importantly, this carveout would only apply when Tinker is satisfied.187 
This Part argues that schools should have the authority to regulate off-
campus speech.  Part III.A explains that allowing schools to regulate off-
campus speech is beneficial for society.  Specifically, it fosters safe learning 
environments in schools and efficiency in courtrooms.  Part III.B describes 
how existing criminal and civil remedies inadequately address off-campus 
bullying.  Part III.C discusses the many policy reasons that support giving 
schools the authority to regulate off-campus bullying speech.  And Part III.D 
explains that allowing schools to regulate off-campus speech does not leave 
bullies susceptible to unfair discipline. 
A.  Allowing Schools to Regulate Off-Campus Speech Is Necessary 
It is important for schools to have the authority to regulate student speech 
that occurs both on and off campus because schools are tasked with creating 
safe environments conducive to learning.188  Bullying that occurs either on 
or off campus causes real harm and prevents schools from providing safe 
learning environments.189 
Whether or not schools can regulate speech should not rest on a distinction 
between on-campus and off-campus conduct.190  Instead, schools should 
have the authority to regulate student speech regardless of where it occurs so 
long as there are “substantial effects” at school.191  If the off-campus bullying 
speech causes—or, in the view of school administrators, is likely to cause—
a substantial disruption at school, then the school should be able to discipline 
the bully.192 
Courts also need to have an efficient way to analyze these types of claims.  
The reasonably foreseeable threshold test, which asks whether it is 
foreseeable that speech may end up at school, is very similar to Tinker’s first 
prong, which asks whether it is foreseeable that speech will cause a 
 
 186. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 187. The Tinker standard is satisfied when school administrators could reasonably forecast 
a substantial disruption in school. Id. 
 188. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra Part I; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text. 
 191. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2017) (prohibiting off-campus bullying if such 
bullying “(i) creates a hostile environment at school for the student against whom such 
bullying was directed, or (ii) infringes on the rights of the student against whom such bullying 
was directed at school, or (iii) substantially disrupts the education process or the orderly 
operation of a school”). 
 192. Courts apply the “effects” test from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), in cases 
where there are insufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction.  The Court’s 
rationale in Calder should apply to a school’s regulatory authority to discipline students. See 
Puiszis, supra note 30, at 224 (“While the jurisdictional question Calder addressed is 
analytically distinct, conceptually the logic of the Court’s rationale generally can be applied 
here, given the nature of Internet speech.”). 
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substantial disruption at school.  Therefore, it would be more efficient to 
collapse the reasonably foreseeable threshold test into Tinker’s first prong.  
Under this approach, courts would continue to apply Tinker’s test from the 
vantage point of school administrators.193 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Wynar and C.R. suggest that 
when the sufficient-nexus threshold test is met, the reasonably foreseeable 
threshold test will likely also be met.194  Therefore, the sufficient-nexus 
threshold test is not materially different from the reasonably foreseeable 
threshold test.195  Rather, it seems like courts may be labeling their fact-
driven analyses as “threshold tests” when, in reality, each case’s outcome is 
fact specific.196 
For these reasons, it would be more efficient for courts to apply Tinker and 
analyze the facts of each case197 instead of hiding behind threshold tests. 
B.  Existing Legal Remedies Do Not Work 
Another reason schools should have regulatory authority to discipline 
students for off-campus speech is that existing criminal and civil remedies 
fail the victims of off-campus bullying.  This section discusses the 
inadequacy of criminal and civil remedies to address off-campus bullying. 
1.  Criminal Remedies Fail the Victims of Off-Campus Bullying 
There has been little success prosecuting cyberbullies.198  An incident at 
Horace Greeley High School “highlights the inability of the legal system to 
effectively deter cyberbullying.”199  Horace Greeley administrators 
suspended two male students for five days because they posted personal 
 
 193. Nonetheless, nothing prevents school administrators from ratcheting down discipline 
for students who could not reasonably foresee the consequences of their bullying speech. 
 194. See supra notes 146–63. 
 195. Gower, supra note 172, at 727, 730 (discussing reasons why the Supreme Court 
continues to deny certiorari in student free-speech cases).  “[T]he circuit courts of appeal are 
not in disagreement over the rule of law to apply; rather, the diverging results and analyses in 
the different circuits are merely based on factual considerations.” Id. at 727. 
 196. The Fifth Circuit has not adopted one specific threshold test to determine whether 
schools may discipline students for their off-campus speech.  Instead, it explicitly declined to 
“adopt or reject approaches advocated by other circuits,” like the sufficient-nexus test or the 
reasonably foreseeable test, because the outcome of each case is “heavily influenced by the 
facts in each matter.” Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383, 396, 400 (5th Cir. 
2015) (holding that a student could be disciplined for his off-campus speech without violating 
the First Amendment where he “posted a rap recording containing threatening language 
against two high school teachers/coaches on the Internet”). 
 197. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 198. See, e.g., United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1494 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
emails expressing sexual interest in violence against women did not constitute “a 
communication containing a threat” within the meaning of the statute); see also DANIELLE 
KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 19 (2014) (“Victims are told not to expect any 
help:  ‘This is the INTERNET folks . . . .  There are no laws here, at least not clearly defined 
ones.’” (alteration in original) (quoting a comment on a blog post)). 
 199. Todd D. Erb, Note, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish 
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 260 (2008). 
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information about female students—“including family history, phone 
numbers, addresses and, most troubling, sexual experience”—on a 
website.200  The principal called the police and the boys were “charged with 
second-degree harassment, which carries a sentence of up to one year in jail 
and a $1,000 fine.”201  But, a few days later, the Westchester District 
Attorney announced that, while some of the material was “‘offensive and 
abhorrent,’ it did not meet the legal definition of harassment and [the] 
criminal charges against the two boys would be dropped.”202  Clearly, there 
were no criminal remedies available to address this behavior. 
If they are available, criminal remedies are often ineffective.  And even in 
the limited instances where criminal remedies can provide adequate redress, 
they are often more detrimental than rehabilitative for the bullies themselves.  
Specifically, criminal remedies contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline.203  
Additionally, they do not serve any educational purpose.204  Young students 
make mistakes.  And school principals can help bullies learn from their 
mistakes without involving the police.205 
2.  Civil Remedies Fail the Victims of Off-Campus Bullying 
Civil remedies do not provide bullying victims with recourse when off-
campus speech substantially disrupts the learning environment but does not 
 
 200. Amy Benfer, Cyber Slammed, SALON (July 3, 2001, 7:03 PM), 
https://www.salon.com/2001/07/03/cyber_bullies/ [https://perma.cc/QL8C-4DMM]. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  Alternatively, this could have been pursued as doxing, “a form of cyberharassment 
involving the public release of personal information that can be used to identify or locate an 
individual.” See Julia M. MacAllister, Note, The Doxing Dilemma:  Seeking a Remedy for the 
Malicious Publication of Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2453 (2017) 
(discussing existing statutory schemes and the need for an effective and consistent legal 
remedy for doxing). 
 203. The school-to-prison pipeline is “a disturbing national trend wherein children are 
funneled out of public schools and into the juvenile and criminal justice systems.” See School-
to-Prison Pipeline, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-
pipeline [https://perma.cc/A57N-68T3] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 204. See Marilyn Elias, The School-to-Prison Pipeline, TEACHING TOLERANCE MAG., 
Spring 2013, at 38, 38–40 (discussing that school discipline fosters learning in ways that 
criminal and punitive discipline do not). 
 205. See infra Part III.C. 
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rise to the level of a “true threat.”206  In other words, there is a category of 
hurtful speech that never makes it to court because it is not threatening.207 
Moreover, litigation is expensive and student victims should not have to 
go to court for redress.  Going to court is detrimental to both the victim and 
the bully.  For example, if student victims of cyberbullying want to file libel 
actions, their bullies can use the affirmative defense that the hurtful 
statements are true.208  So if the bully called the victim a “slut” or “fat,” the 
bully could use the defense that the statements are true.209  This type of 
litigation would likely hurt the victim even more, while also inaccurately 
teaching the bully that actions do not have consequences.  It is a lose-lose 
situation. 
In sum, civil remedies fail to provide bullying victims with proper redress 
because bullies often use speech that is neither actually threatening nor meets 
the legal standard of libel.  And even in the limited instances where civil 
remedies can provide adequate redress, they are often expensive and harmful 
for the victim. 
C.  Policy Reasons Support Granting Schools Broad Regulatory Authority 
over Off-Campus Bullying Speech 
This section discusses why giving schools regulatory authority over off-
campus bullying speech is good public policy.  First, school systems are 
better suited than local police departments and courts when it comes to 
working with children and regulating student speech.  Second, teachers and 
school administrators need legal support to teach and run schools.  And third, 
all forms of off-campus bullying should be treated equally. 
1.  School Systems Are a More Appropriate Regulator 
“The determination of what manner of [student] speech . . . is 
inappropriate properly rests with the school board”210 and not the courts 
 
 206. The phrase “true threat” is a constitutional term of art used to describe a category of 
speech that the First Amendment does not protect. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 
708 (1969); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782 (E.D. Mich. 
2002) (finding that a website containing a list of students that one student wished would die 
and included a “mission” for all those reading the website to “[s]tab someone for no reason[,] 
then set them on fire[,] throw them off a cliff, watch them suffer and with their last breath, just 
before everything goes black, spit on their face” did not constitute a true threat); see also Lisa 
L. Swem, Sticks and Stones in Cyberspace, LEADERSHIP INSIDER, Aug. 2006, at 5, 11; Erb, 
supra note 199, at 271 (“[M]any school officials are frustrated and left wondering what can 
be done to address speech that does not rise to the level of a ‘true threat’ . . . but still negatively 
affects the school environment and the students that attend the school.”). 
 207. Speech is a “true threat” if a reasonable person would interpret it “as a serious 
expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm.” See Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special 
Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 208. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (“It is true that in defamation 
actions, where the protected interest is personal reputation, the prevailing view is that truth is 
a defense . . . .”). 
 209. See Erb, supra note 199, at 279. 
 210. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); see also Safford Unified 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 n.1 (2009) (“[S]tandards of conduct for schools 
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because school systems are very involved with parents and children in the 
community.211  First, parent-teacher conferences often take place several 
times a year to keep parents informed about their children.  At these meetings, 
teachers team up with parents to better meet students’ academic and 
behavioral needs.  Parent-teacher partnerships are effective because they 
often lead to higher student achievement.212  Second, parent-teacher 
organizations (PTOs) give parents another opportunity to be involved in 
school affairs.  Parents often act as volunteers in schools, but they can also 
participate in the educational process by attending local school meetings.  
Third, parents are invited to attend school board meetings to voice opinions 
and concerns about educational policies affecting the local community. 
In contrast, criminal and judicial systems are much less willing to involve 
parents in their affairs.  Police departments are too busy to look into small 
burglaries,213 much less bullying that affects students at school.214  And court 
dockets are already overloaded.215 
For these reasons, it is most practical to allow school systems to regulate 
off-campus bullying speech that affects students on campus. 
 
are for school administrators to determine without second-guessing by courts lacking the 
experience to appreciate what may be needed.” (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
342 n.9 (1985))); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 428 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“[N]o one wishes to substitute courts for school boards, or to turn the 
judge’s chambers into the principal’s office.”); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. 
Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[J]udges are incompetent to tell school 
authorities how to run schools in a way that will preserve an atmosphere conducive to 
learning . . . .”); THOMAS, supra note 50, at 83 (“[T]he judiciary has been reluctant to interfere 
with school boards’ prerogatives in selecting and eliminating instructional materials.”). 
 211. Justin Patchin, Opinion, Most Bullying Cases Aren’t Criminal, N.Y. TIMES:  ROOM 
FOR DEBATE (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/09/30/ 
cyberbullying-and-a-students-suicide/most-bullying-cases-arent-criminal [https://perma.cc/ 
WXK5-GV8L] (“The vast majority of cyberbullying incidents can and should be handled 
informally:  with parents, schools, and others working together to address the problem before 
it rises to the level of a violation of criminal law.”). 
 212. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Building Parent-Teacher Relationships, READING ROCKETS, 
http://www.readingrockets.org/article/building-parent-teacher-relationships 
[https://perma.cc/C8FP-KHN5] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (“Substantial evidence exists 
showing that parent involvement benefits students, including raising their academic 
achievement.”). 
 213. See Patrick Scott & Ellie Kempster, Revealed:  How Likely Is It That the Police Will 
Manage to Catch the Person Who Burgles Your House?, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 19, 2017, 4:04 
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/19/nine-10-home-burglaries-now-go-
unsolved-effective-police-force/ [https://perma.cc/EJ93-HC2C]. 
 214. Erb, supra note 199, at 283. 
 215. Id.; see also Martha Neil, US Courts:  Federal Litigants Face Record Civil-Case 
Backlog Due to Shortage of Judges, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/us_courts_federal_litigants_face_record_civil_case
_backlog_due_to_shortage [https://perma.cc/X2H9-P7MP] (discussing the backlog of cases 
and mentioning that “the federal prison population has grown by more than 50 percent”); 
Sudhin Thanawala, Wheels of Justice Slow at Overloaded Federal Courts, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 
28, 2015, 12:32 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/sns-bc-us--federal-
case-backlog-20150927-story.html [https://perma.cc/6ULH-LSFD] (“[F]ederal district courts 
have seen a rise in recent years in the time it takes to get civil cases to trial and resolve felony 
criminal cases as judges’ workloads have increased . . . .”). 
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2.  Teachers and School Administrators Are Entitled to Legal Protection 
Teachers and school administrators need support from the legal system to 
do their jobs.  Today, teachers fear being sued by both bullying victims and 
bullies.216  Specifically, teachers may be sued by bullying victims if they do 
not discipline bullies and by bullies if they do.217 
Bullies cannot get away with bullying merely because parents, “the 
primary agents in the pediatric safety system[,] falter in preventing and 
responding effectively.”218  Instead, “professionals who teach the young 
[should] assume additional responsibilities as protectors, cyber ethicists, and 
disciplinarians.”219  While “good” teachers will assume additional 
responsibilities, “smart” teachers will do so only when they have legal 
support.220 
Teachers will have the support they need to control their classrooms if the 
Supreme Court recognizes schools’ authority to regulate off-campus bullying 
speech.  Specifically, teachers will be able to discipline students for off-
campus bullying speech that substantially disrupts the classroom 
environment without fearing lawsuits. 
3.  It Is Necessary to Treat Cyberbullying and Other Forms of 
Off-Campus Bullying Equally 
The majority of off-campus bullying cases involve cyberbullying.  
Accordingly, while the Supreme Court may be more inclined to hear a 
cyberbullying case, it is still important for the Court to recognize that schools 
should have the authority to regulate other forms of off-campus bullying 
speech. 
 
 216. See Abrams, supra note 58, at 187 (discussing how school authorities often avoid 
meaningful discipline because they fear that students and their parents will respond with 
lawsuits); see also Elizabeth Elizalde, Family of New Jersey Cheerleader Suing School 
District After Cyberbullying Led to Girl’s Suicide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017, 12:52 
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/n-family-suing-school-not-stopping-girl-
cyberbullying-article-1.3375238 [https://perma.cc/AQ36-GUPV]. 
 217. See Fenn, supra note 23, at 2765 (discussing how schools may be liable to victims of 
cyberbullying if they did not act aggressively to combat it or to off-campus bullies if courts 
find that schools violated cyberbullies’ First Amendment rights). 
 218. Abrams, supra note 58, at 224. 
 219. Id. (“Teachers and administrators frequently assume responsibility not only as 
classroom instructors, but also as counselors, confidantes, psychologists, hygienists, 
nutritionists, and various other authority figures essential to the growth and development of 
an entire generation of children.”); see also Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 
615, 635 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Educators serve as surrogate parents, psychologists, social workers, 
and security guards, above and beyond their normal teaching responsibilities.”). 
 220. See Tresa Baldas, School Suits, NAT’L L.J. (May 17, 2004, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/900005407928/school-suits/ 
[https://perma.cc/QQH9-TEQV] (discussing an interactive poll of 800 public school teachers 
and principals nationwide, which found that 82 percent of teachers and 77 percent of principals 
agree that fear of lawsuits has created a “defensive teaching mode . . . motivated by a desire 
to avoid” litigation); id. (“[N]early 8 in 10 teachers, 78%, say students are quick to remind 
them that they have rights or that their parents can sue, . . . [and] 62% of principals said that 
they have been threatened with a legal challenge . . . .”). 
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Some may argue that cyberbullying is the only form of off-campus speech 
that should be regulated by schools because the hurtful speech can be 
accessed anytime and anywhere, including at school.221  And while it is true 
that cyberbullying has an “everywhere” and “all the time” effect222 there are 
also instances where in-person bullying has this effect.223  This was found to 
be the case in C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J, where a student was 
suspended for harassing two disabled students while walking home from 
school.224  In these instances, schools should have the authority to discipline 
students. 
D.  There Should Be Adequate Safeguards for Those Accused of Bullying 
Even though this Note argues that schools should have broad authority to 
regulate student bullying speech, significant procedural safeguards should be 
available for those accused of bullying.  Allowing schools to protect bullying 
victims by regulating off-campus speech should not swing the pendulum too 
far by subjecting bullies to unfair discipline without having an opportunity to 
be heard.  And while “[t]here is no constitutional right to be a bully,”225 there 
are many ways schools could ensure that bullies are treated fairly. 
First, schools should provide all students and their families with written 
notice before the school year begins that there will be zero tolerance for 
bullying and that those who violate the school’s antibullying policy may be 
disciplined and possibly suspended from school.  The school’s antibullying 
policy should also explicitly caution that students may be held responsible 
both for off-campus and on-campus bullying. 
Second, teachers and school administrators should only be permitted to 
discipline students for off-campus speech in accordance with school district 
policies and procedures.  Students facing suspension or expulsion should, at 
a minimum, be given notice of the charges against them and afforded a 
hearing.226 
 
 221. Proponents of this view would allow schools to discipline students for bullying that 
occurs on Facebook but not for bullying that occurs at a public park or during a playdate. See 
supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 222. McDonald, supra note 60, at 746 (“[C]yberbullying can be engaged in with much less 
effort or notice than traditional bullying, even anonymously, and the concomitant threat to the 
targeted student’s psychological well being seems sufficiently greater to make it legitimate for 
schools to take cognizance of such disputes and apply speech standards to them that take into 
account the need to protect the learning environment for targeted students.”). 
 223. See supra notes 155–63 and accompanying text. 
 224. 835 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[The incident] occurred about five minutes after 
school let out, a few hundred feet from campus.”). 
 225. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Intimidation of one student by another, including intimidation by name calling, is the kind 
of behavior school authorities are expected to control or prevent.”). 
 226. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572–76 (1975) (holding that a suspension without a 
hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a case where an 
Ohio statute guaranteed a free education to all residents). 
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Third, like the imposition of other school sanctions, the type of discipline 
should be proportional to the offense.227  Teachers and school administrators 
should take various factors into account, including the student’s age, the 
severity of the bullying, and whether the bully is a first-time offender. 
Fourth, another protection for accused bullies should include the use of 
positive behavior interventions and supports, which is becoming increasingly 
popular.228  Today, many schools are moving away from traditional types of 
discipline,229 like suspensions, because recent research shows that sending 
students home from school may do them more harm than good.230  Therefore, 
when school administrators consider the appropriate form of discipline for 
students who have engaged in off-campus bullying speech, they should 
examine whether to employ a form of positive behavior intervention or 
support.231  Schools should use the least punitive measures available if they 
are adequate to protect the victim and the school’s learning environment.  But 
there will still be times where suspensions are the only adequate remedy.  
And when school administrators use their professional judgment to suspend 
students, instead of administering positive behavior interventions, courts 
should give schools great deference—because these decisions can save lives. 
CONCLUSION 
Bullying, both on and off campus, has far-reaching consequences.  The 
Supreme Court cases establishing the contours of free speech doctrine as 
applied to public schools are outdated and ineffective because they do not 
address off-campus bullying speech.  The Supreme Court has had several 
 
 227. Types of discipline include, but are not limited to, receiving a detention, suspension, 
or expulsion.  Other creative forms of discipline may include getting “bully-related” 
homework like writing an apology, losing a school privilege, or receiving a parent notification. 
 228. “Positive Behavior Interventions and Supports is a systems approach to establishing 
the social culture and behavioral supports needed for all children in a school to achieve both 
social and academic success.” Rob Horner, George Sugai & Timothy Lewis, Is School-Wide 
Positive Behavior Support an Evidence-Based Practice?, PBIS (Apr. 2015), 
https://www.pbis.org/research [https://perma.cc/49WZ-Q4MR].  It includes preventative and 
responsive approaches that may be implemented with all students in a classroom and 
intensified to support small groups or individual students. Id. 
 229. The current trend is for schools to limit the number of suspensions wherever possible. 
See Jane Adams, Suspensions and Expulsions Decline as Districts Adopt Alternatives, State 
Says, EDSOURCE (Jan. 13, 2016), https://edsource.org/2016/suspensions-and-expulsions-
decline-as-districts-adopt-alternatives-state-says/93297 [https://perma.cc/NP5L-6HBQ]. 
 230. See Christopher Ferguson, Does Suspending Students Work?, TIME (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://ideas.time.com/2012/12/05/does-suspending-students-work/ [https://perma.cc/EFN6-
FRUU] (explaining that suspending a student does “nothing to teach appropriate alternative 
behavior nor address underlying issues that may be causing the bad behavior”); LouAnne 
Johnson, Down with Detention!, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 30, 2004), 
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2004/12/01/14johnson.h24.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9Q8M-UH52] (“Using detention as a catchall cure for student misbehaviors is like using one 
medicine for every physical ailment.”). 
 231. As a former first grade teacher, I have implemented several positive behavior 
interventions for my students, including:  (1) speaking to the student-bully about the impacts 
of bullying, (2) hosting group interventions allowing student-bullies to apologize to student-
victims, and (3) creating behavior-management plans to reinforce positive “nonbullying” 
behaviors. 
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opportunities to define the parameters of student speech but has declined to 
do so.232  As a result, educators and students must continue to guess how a 
court would rule in any specific case.233  The Supreme Court should clarify 
Tinker’s test as both a jurisdictional and substantive test.  Doing so would 
allow school administrators to regulate students’ off-campus bullying speech 
and save lives. 
 
 232. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari in off-campus student speech 
cases. See C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 2117 (2017); see also Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011). 
 233. Gower, supra note 172, at 722. 
